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HALO ELECS., INC. v. PULSE ELECS., INC.,
136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Eng'g, Inc., Petitioner, Halo
Electronics, Inc. ("Halo"), filed suit against Respondents, Pulse
Electronics, Inc. and Pulse Electronics Corporation ("Pulse"), for
patent infringement.1  Halo alleged that Pulse infringed upon
Halo's patents, U.S. Patent No. 5,656,985 (the '985 patent), U.S.
Patent No. 6,297,720 (the '720 patent), and U.S. Patent No.
6,344,785 (the '785 patent), for electronic packages containing
surface-mountable transformers for circuit boards.2 Pulse
counterclaimed, alleging that Halo infringed its patents, U.S.
Patent No. 6,769,936 (the '936 patent) and U.S. Patent No.
6,116,963 (the '963 patent). Pulse also alleged that Halo's patents
were invalid on the grounds of obviousness. 3 The United States
District Court for the District of Nevada held that the Halo's
patents were not invalid because they were not obvious and that
there was no willful infringement of Halo's patents by Pulse.4
Both parties appealed the district court's decision and the
Federal Circuit, in Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., applied
the two-part test of In re Seagate Technology, LLC to determine
I Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Eng'g, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1182 (D. Nev.
2011).
2 id.
Id. A patent is invalid on grounds of obviousness if the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2011). Thus, when a patent simply arranges
old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to
perform and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement,
the combination is obvious. KSR Int'l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417
(2007).
4 Halo 810 F. Supp. 2d at 1200, 1209.
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enhanced damages.5 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision by holding that there was no willful infringement
of Halo's patents by Pulse. The Federal Circuit also denied the
grant of enhanced damages to Halo because Halo failed to show
objective recklessness on the part of Pulse to satisfy the first prong
of the Seagate test.6
Both parties filed writs of certiorari and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse
Elecs., Inc. . Ultimately, the Supreme Court vacated the Federal
Circuit's decision and remanded the case back to the Federal
Circuit.8 The Supreme Court held that the standard of proof
endorsed in the Seagate two-part test was inconsistent with the
standard of proof for awarding enhanced damages under § 284 of
the Patent Act.9 The Supreme Court rejected the Seagate test by
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(citing In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit adopted a two-part test
for determining when a district court may award enhanced damages for willful
patent infringement. To prevail on a claim of willful patent infringement under
Seagate, the patent owner must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that:
(1) the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions
constituted infringement of a valid patent (the objective recklessness
component); and
(2) the risk of infringement was either known or so obvious that it should
have been known to the accused infringer (the subjective intent
component).
6 Id. at 1376-77.
7 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1931 (2016).
8 Id. at 1935-36.
9 Id. at 1933-34. The relevant text of § 284 provides that the court may increase
the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed. 35 U.S.C. § 284
(2011). The statutory language contains no explicit limit or condition, and the
Court has emphasized that the "word 'may' clearly connotes discretion (quoting
Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 136 (2005)). At the same time,
discretion is not whim and a motion to a court's discretion is a motion, not to its
inclination, but to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal
principles (quoting Martin, 546 U.S. at 139). Thus, although there is no precise
rule or formula for awarding damages under §284, a district court's discretion
[Vol. XXV11:255
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holding that the amount of damages awarded, sometimes treble
damages in cases of willful infringement, are within the district
court's discretion and does not require both prongs of the Seagate
test to be satisfied.'o
The Supreme Court's decision in this case is noteworthy as
it reduces the high burden on a patent holder to demonstrate willful
infringement. Furthermore, this decision means that lower courts
have unfettered discretion when deciding the amount of treble
damages to award in patent infringement suits, thereby lifting the
artificial construct of the Seagate test and instead allowing the
determination to be based on judicial discretion as permitted under
§ 284 of the Patent Act.1
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
Halo Electronics, Inc. is a supplier of electronic
components and owns the '985, '720 and '785 patents, which
pertain to the design of electronic packages that are mountable on
the surfaces of circuit boards found inside electronic devices like
computers and internet routers.12 Pulse Electronics, Inc., a
competing electronic component manufacturer, designs and sells
surface mount electronic packages that are manufactured in Asia.13
Some of Pulse's products were delivered to customers in the
United States whereas other products were delivered to contract
manufacturers of global companies for world-wide distribution.14
For products that were delivered abroad, Pulse received its sales
should be exercised in light of the considerations underlying the grant of that
discretion (citing Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014)).
'Id. at 1935.
1 "Id.
12 Halo, 769 F.3d at 1374.
" Id. at 1375.
14 d
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offers at its foreign offices.1 5 However, on the pricing negotiation
front, Pulse engaged in negotiations with global companies, such
as Cisco within the United States. In these negotiations, Pulse
approved the pricing structure for global sales, participated in
design meetings with Cisco engineers, sent product-samples to
Cisco for pre-approval, attended sales meetings with potential
customers, and provided post-sale product-support.16
Since 1998, Pulse allegedly knew about Halo's patents.1
In 2002, Halo sent two letters to Pulse which offered licenses to its
patents without accusing Pulse of infringement.' Pulse's
President contacted an in-house engineer, who reviewed Halo's
patents and concluded that they were invalid in light of Pulse's
prior products. 19 Pulse did not further consult independent legal
counsel to determine the validity of Halo's patents and continued
to sell Pulse's surface mount electronic package products.2 0
B. Procedural History
In 2007, Halo filed a lawsuit against Pulse for infringement
of its three patents, the '985, '720, and '785 patents.21 Pulse
counterclaimed, alleging that Halo's patents were invalid based on
the grounds of obviousness and that Halo infringed Pulse's '963
patent.2 2 The jury held that
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 1376.
s Halo, 769 F.3d at 1376.
19 Id. The products in question here are Pulse's surface mount electronic
packages containing single, multiple and microelectronic connector assemblies
which may include electronic components (citing Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse
Eng'g, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 2d 989, 993 (D. Nev. 2010)).
20 oid.
21 id.
22 Id. Pulse's '963 patent outlines the construction of a microelectronic
connector that incorporates a simplified design and permits rapid assembly of
electronic components (citing Halo Elecs., 721 F. Supp. 2d at 993).
[Vol. XXVII:255
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that: (1) Pulse directly infringed Halo's patents with products that
it shipped into the United States; (2) Pulse induced others to
infringe Halo's patents with products that it delivered outside the
United States but ultimately imported into the United States in
finished end products; (3) a high probability exists that Pulse's
infringement was willful; and (4) Halo's patents were not invalid
on obviousness grounds.2 3
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada
denied Halo enhanced damages under § 284 of the Patent Act.24
The district court reasoned that Pulse's defense was not
"objectively baseless." 2 5 For instance in its defense, Pulse argued
that Halo failed to sufficiently allege that Pulse committed patent
infringement in its 2002 letters to Pulse.2 6  Furthermore, the
district court found that Pulse's argument that Halo's prior art
disclosed each element of the asserted claims, which could then be
combined and modified to make Pulse's electronic packages, had
merit.27 Lastly, applying the two-part test for determining
enhanced damages from Seagate, the district court also held that
Halo failed to satisfy the first prong of objective recklessness and
found Halo's willful infringement claims unpersuasive. 28  The
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 2 9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Federal
Circuit judgment, and remanded the case.3 0 The Court reasoned
that the standard of proving objective recklessness under the
Seagate test is clear and convincing evidence, which is
inconsistent with the standard of proof governing patent
infringement litigation under § 284 of the Patent Act, which
23 Id.
24 Halo, 769 F.3d at 1376.
25 id
26 Id. at 1382.
27 id.2 8 d29 Id. at 1383.
30 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1935-36.
2017] 259
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requires the less stringent standard of preponderance of evidence.31
The Supreme Court also rejected Seagate's two-pronged test for
willful infringement in patent cases stating that subjective
willfulness is enough to warrant enhanced damages. 3 2 According
to the Supreme Court, such enhanced damages can be awarded
solely based on judicial discretion. 3 3
III. DISCUSSION
In determining the standard of proof for enhanced damages
in patent infringement cases, the Supreme Court looked at the
statutory text of § 284 of the Patent Act. 3 4 Section 284 of the
Patent Act provides that "the court may increase the damages up to
three times the amount found or assessed." 3 5 The term "may"
clearly connotes judicial discretion.3 6 Although the statute does
not specify any limits upon the court's discretion, the court's
discretion in awarding enhanced damages must be guided by
sound legal principles.3 7 Enhanced damages awarded over the past
180 years have established that such awards are not disbursed in
lay infringement cases, but instead are reserved for egregious
infringement behavior. 3 8  Such behavior can include willful,
wanton, malicious, bad-faith conduct on the part of infringers. 3 9
The Supreme Court also rejected the Seagate two-prong
test.4 0 The Supreme Court reasoned that although the test required
egregious conduct to award enhanced damages, its two-pronged
analysis was unduly rigid and unacceptably obstructed the
31 Id. at 1934.
32 Id. at 1933.
3 d. at 1935.
34 Id. at 1931.
3 5 id.
36 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1931 (quoting Martin, 546 U.S. at 136).
37 Id. at 1932.
3 8 id.
3 9 id.
40 id.
[Vol. XXVII:255
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discretion of district courts. 4 1 The Supreme Court noted that the
Seagate test would be unduly burdensome as it could have the
effect of insulating some of the worst patent infringers from any
42liability for enhanced damages. According to the Supreme
Court, patent infringers are insulated from liability under Seagate
in that: (A) the test requires a showing of objective recklessness on
the part of the infringer rather considering the subjective
willfulness to infringe; and (B) Seagate applies the incorrect
burden of proof standard.43
A. Objective Recklessness Prong of the Seagate Test is Not
Required to Award Enhanced Damages in Patent
Litigation
The Supreme Court's primary issue with the Seagate test is
that it requires a principal finding of objective recklessness before
enhanced damages can be awarded in patent infringement cases.44
This standard allows the most culpable, wanton and malicious
offenders, who intentionally infringe another's patent, to be
protected from liability. 45
The Supreme Court relied on its prior decision in Octane
Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., a patent
infringement suit involving an elliptical exercise machine.4 6
There, while determining the award of attorney's fees under § 285
of the Patent Act to the prevailing party, the Supreme Court found
the machine manufacturer's subjective bad faith to be dispositive,
in lieu of the asserted claim being both objectively baseless and
being brought in subjective bad faith.47 The Supreme Court
4) id.
42 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932.
43 Idat 1932-34.
"Id. at 1932.
45 Id.
46 Id. (citing Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1754-55).
47 Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1751, 1756
(2014).
2017] 61
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reasoned that a two-part objective and subjective test imposes an
inflexible framework onto statutory text that is inherently
flexible.48
Applying its reasoning in Octane Fitness, the Supreme
Court in Halo Elecs., held that subjective willfulness on the part of
a patent infringer is enough to warrant enhanced damages, without
any regard to whether the infringement was objectively reckless.4 9
The Supreme Court noted that the Seagate test imposes an
artificial construct of objective recklessness which thereby shields
the bad faith infringer from liability.5 0 The willful infringer can
escape liability under § 284 of the Patent Act simply based on the
patentee's failure to demonstrate objective recklessness. 5 ' Thus,
the infringer prevails in cases where the infringer was not aware of
the defense at the time of the infringing act.52 The Supreme Court
emphasized that nothing in § 284 of the Patent Act requires a
finding of egregious misconduct to be made prior to the award of
enhanced damages. 53  Courts should consider the particular
circumstances surrounding the infringing conduct on a case-by-
case basis in determining the amount and award of damages. 54
The Supreme Court, in rejecting the rigid Seagate framework,
reasoned that enhanced damages awards in patent infringement
cases should be a discretionary decision for the district courts, that
should be reserved for instances of egregious, willful
misconduct.
Under Federal Circuit precedent, an award of enhanced
damages under Seagate is subject to tripartite appellate review: the
first step of objective recklessness is reviewed de novo; the second
step of subjective knowledge is reviewed for substantial evidence;
48 Id.
49 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933.
'
0 Id. at 1935.
51 Id. at 1933.
52 id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
" Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1935.
[Vol. XXV11:255
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and the final decision of awarding enhanced damages is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. 56  In Halo Elecs., the Supreme Court
avoids using a rigid formula to calculate enhanced damages under
§ 284 of the Patent Act, and also rejects the tripartite framework
for appellate review as advocated by the Federal Circuit.17 Citing
the Court's prior decision in Octane Fitness, the Court in Halo
Elecs noted that § 284 of the Patent Act gives complete discretion
to district courts in meting out enhanced damages in patent
infringement cases, which are only reviewable on appeal for abuse
of discretion.5 The Supreme Court responded to concerns
regarding the district courts ready, unwavering grant of damages to
patentees and the distortion of balance between the protection of
patent rights on one hand and the attention to technological
innovation on the other. 59 In order to offset the above-mentioned
concerns the Supreme Court reasoned that district court decisions
should be informed by the considerations identified by this Court
in Octane Fitness, which involves a non-exclusive list of factors,
including frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness
(both in the factual and legal components of the case) and the need
in particular circumstances to advance considerations of
compensation and deterrence. 60
56 Id.at 1930. See Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W. L. Gore & Assocs., Inc.
682 F.3d 1003, 1005, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting that the threshold objective
prong of the willfulness standard enunciated in Seagate is a question of law
based on underlying mixed questions of law and fact and is subject to de
novo review, and the subjective willfulness findings can be reviewed for
substantial evidence); Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the district court's decision on enhancement of
damages is reviewed for abuse of discretion, that is, whether the decision was
based on clearly erroneous findings of fact, an incorrect conclusion of law, or a
clear error of judgment).
7 Id. at 1934.
5 8 id.5 9 id.
60 See Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 (citing Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510
U.S. 517, 534 (1994)).
2017] 263
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The Supreme Court noted that the language used by
Congress to reenact § 284 of the Patent Act unambiguously
conferred discretion to the district courts.61 Respondents pointed
to isolated snippets of legislative history referring to an
endorsement of the Seagate framework by Congress, but the
Supreme Court rejected their arguments by pointing to Congress's
failure to adopt a proposed codification similar to Seagate.62 The
Supreme Court acknowledged that patent law reflects a careful
balance between the need to facilitate innovation through patent
protection, and the need to implement refinement of innovation
through imitation which in turn, is highly necessary to invention
itself and is indispensable to maintain a competitive economy.6 3
That balance can be disrupted if enhanced damages are awarded
for infringement in ordinary cases.6 However, § 284 of the Patent
Act confirms 6udicial discretion in awarding damages for patent
infringement.6 Lifting the unduly confining barrier imposed on
the decision-making of the courts by Seagate, the Supreme Court
advocated in favor of discretionary judgments for damages awards
by district courts in patent infringement cases. 6 6 In applying this
discretion, district courts are to be guided by sound legal principles
developed over 200 years of application and interpretation of the
Patent Act, which will direct the judgments to limit the award of
enhanced damages in patent infringement cases only in egregious
instances of misconduct that fall way beyond the purview of lay
infringement.6 7
61 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1934-35.62 Id. See Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 11 1 b Cong., 1st Sess., § 5(e)
(as introduced Mar. 3, 2009).
63 Id. at 1935. (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 146 (1989)).
64 id.
65 Id.
66 d
67 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1935.
[Vol. XXV11:255
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B. Incorrect Burden ofProof Standard Applied in Seagate
The Supreme Court looked to the statutory text of § 284 of
the Patent Act to reinforce the inconsistency between Seagate and
the statute.68 The Seagate test requires a clear and convincing
standard of proof in order to prove objective recklessness and this
stringent standard was rejected by the Court in Octane Fitness,
while determining attorney's fees awards in patent infringement
cases. 69 Similar to § 285 of the Patent Act, which was at issue in
Octane Fitness, § 284 of the Patent Act, which is at issue in Halo
Elecs., imposes no specific evidentiary burden on the patentee,
much less such a high standard in order to determine
infringement.7 0  The Supreme Court emphasized that of
importance here, is the enactment of a higher standard of proof
erected by Congress elsewhere in the Patent Act, in § 273(b),
which shifts the burden of proof to the person asserting the defense
by a clear and convincing standard. 7 1 According to the Supreme
Court, nothing in the statutory text of § 284 imposes a heightened
standard of proof on the patentee's part and patent infringement
litigation has typically been governed by a preponderance of
evidence standard, a less stringent burden on the plaintiff, which
should be upheld in cases of enhanced damages awards.7 2
IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The Supreme Court's analysis in Halo Elecs. to lower the
evidentiary burden on the plaintiff in patent infringement cases
68 id.
69 Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1758.70 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1935. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1952) (noting that the court in
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party but
there is no mention of a specific burden of proof on the patentee's part in order
to demonstrate infringement).
71 Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 273(b) (2011)).72 Id. (citing Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1758).
2017] 265
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ultimately comes down to a matter of policy. 7 3 Respondents are
concerned that allowing district courts such unfettered discretion
in awarding treble damages in infringement cases will stifle
innovation as companies will try to avoid any plausible
interference with someone else's patent rights.7 4 There is also
widespread concern that easy availability of such damages will
encourage patent trolls to terrorize weaker parties into settlement
negotiations. 7 5
Halo Elecs. has also left open the question of what
constitutes "willful infringement" and the importance of letters
from counsel with regard to the determination of "willfulness". 7 6
Willfulness may not be inferred from the mere fact that the alleged
infringer knew about the patent and nothing more.7 7 Willfulness
should be assessed in the context in which it appears, and the
majority in Halo Elecs. has determined that intentional and
knowing infringement "may" warrant a punitive sanction,
indicating that enhanced damages might not be available in all
instances of egregious conduct.7
In the highly competitive economy, firms can use patents
to force companies into structuring licensing arrangements, and
parties afraid of enhanced damages may be encouraged to settle or
. . . . 79
abandon any challenging activity, in turn impairing innovation.
This approach, might in turn, pose a risk that a patent's scope can
be impermissibly expanded to curtail lawful activity and patentees
7 Id.
74 id.
7 Id. (noting trolls to be entities that hold patents for the primary purpose of
enforcing them against alleged infringers, often collecting enormous licensing
fees by threatening litigation).
76 Gauri Prakash-Canjels, Matthew Harrison, Alex Mann, Brewer Attorneys and
Counselors, Thoughts on Patent Damages Landscape Post-Halo, LAW 360,
Aug. 8, 2016, https://www.1aw360.com/articles/825161/thoughts-on-patent-
damages-landscape-post-halo.
" Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1936 (Breyer, J., concurring).
78 Id. at 1933, 1936 (Breyer, J., concurring).
79 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1936 (Breyer, J., concurring).
[Vol. XXVII:255
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in going after potential infringers for enhanced damages will
frustrate the objectives of Article I of the Constitution." Thus, in
the context of enhanced damages, there are risks on both sides of
the equation. This elucidates the importance of the cautious
application of the enhanced damages awards, only in cases of
egregious misconduct. 8 2
Enhanced damages in patent infringement cases post Halo
Elecs. have been awarded where defendants were aware of the
infringement and tried to conceal the infringement, or were aware
of prior patents and made no efforts to investigate available
83defenses. In Halo Elecs., the Supreme Court appropriately made
it much easier for patentees to recover against bad faith defendants
by lifting the statutory construct on the burden of proof for
patentee-plaintiffs.84 One consequence of the decision in Halo
Elecs. is the inflection in the paradigm of patent litigation, owing
to the removal of the objective component and focus being drawn
on the subjective willfulness aspect and dismissal of certain
so Idat 1937. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (noting that the progress of
science and useful arts can be promoted by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries).
See Brief of Public Knowledge as Amici Curiae, supra, at 77 (noting predatory
patent practices undermined a new and highly praised virtual-reality glasses
shopping system); Brief of Amici Curiae Internet Companies, supra, at 77
(recognizing threat of enhanced damages hindered collaborative efforts to set
industry-wide standards for matters such as internet protocols).
81 Id. at 1938 (Breyer, J., concurring).
82 id.
83 See PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Coming Optical Commc'ns RF, LLC, 193 F.
Supp. 3d 133, 148 (N.D.N.Y. 2016) (noting willful infringement where a
defendant reused features previously known to be infringing, concealed its
infringement, and continued to infringe plaintiff s patents even after being
sued); Georgetown Rail Equip. Co. v. Holland LP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
78365 *79-80 (E.D. Tex. June 16, 2016) (enhancing damages awards where
there was circumstantial evidence of copying on part of the defendant,
defendant was aware of plaintiff s patents, the defendant made no efforts to
investigate defenses).
84 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1935.
2017] 267
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defenses typically employed to avoid infringement penalties.8 5 In
the wake of Halo Elecs., potential infringers being wary of willful
infringement findings down the line, may be more willing to settle
litigation suits in order to avoid paying treble damages to the other
side, thus reducing typically expensive patent litigation. 8 6
At the cost to some potential curtailment of innovation,
Halo Elecs. has resulted in removing the insulations for some of
the worst, malicious patent infringers to escape potential liability
through reliance on post-hoc defenses.8 7  Plaintiffs should
investigate all possible facts of potential infringement cases,
including instances demonstrating copying by defendants and
access to the patented products.8  Defendants should argue in
favor of willfulness determinations by the court instead of a jury,
to prevent spillover effects on liability or damages.89
85 See Prakash-Canjels, Harrison, Mann, Brewer Attorneys and Counselors,
Thoughts on Patent Damages Landscape Post-Halo, LAW 360, Aug. 8, 2016,
https://www.law360.com/articles/825161/thoughts-on-patent-damages-
landscape-post-halo.
86 Id. See Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (noting once
willful infringement is demonstrated, in determining whether to enhance
damages and the amount of the enhancement warranted, courts may now apply
the non-exclusive Read factors: (1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the
ideas of another; (2) whether the infringer investigated the scope of the patent
and formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed; (3)
the infringer's behavior as a party to the litigation; (4) the defendant's size and
financial condition; (5) the closeness of the case; (6) the duration of the
defendant's misconduct; (7) remedial action by the defendant; (8) the
defendant's motivation for harm; and (9) whether the defendant attempted to
conceal its misconduct); Georgetown Rail, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78365 *45
(E.D. Tex. June 16, 2016) (reasoning no single factor is determinative, and not
all factors need to weigh in favor of an enhanced damages award, and applying
the Read factors to enhance damages from $1.5M to $2.5M and awarding fees
where there was circumstantial evidence of willful copying by the defendant and
the defendant made no efforts to investigate defenses).
' CRAIG COUNTRYMAN, FISH & RICHARDSON, ENHANCED
DAMAGES IN PATENT CASES AFTER HALO V. PULSE (2016), available
at http://www.fr.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/FinalHalo_6_23_16.pdf.88 id.
89 id.
[Vol. XXVII:255
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V. CONCLUSION
Halo Electronics, Inc. filed suit against Pulse Electronics,
Inc. and Pulse Electronics Corporation ("Pulse") alleging patent
infringement of three Halo patents. Pulse counterclaimed, alleging
infringement on Halo's part of two Pulse patents and invalidity of
the Halo patents on grounds of obviousness. The Supreme Court
affirmed the Federal Circuit's holding that Halo's patents were
non-obvious and hence, valid, but reversed the Federal Circuit's
decision of non-infringement by Pulse, and remanded the case
back for consideration by the Federal Circuit. The Supreme Court
noted that the standard of proof advocated in Seagate that was
accepted by the Federal Circuit was inconsistent with the standard
of proof for awarding enhanced damages under § 284 of the Patent
Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the more stringent Seagate test
by holding that the amount of enhanced damages awarded in cases
of willful patent infringement are a matter of discretion for the
district court and does not require both prongs of the Seagate test
to be satisfied. Subjective bad faith on the infringer's part is
enough to justify an award of treble damages to the patentee. The
Supreme Court also emphasized that patent litigation is governed
by a preponderance of evidence standard, which is in accordance
with § 284 of the Patent Act. Post-Halo, potential infringers might
be more willing to settle patent litigation suits, in an effort to avoid
paying enhanced damages to the prevailing patentees. This case
has also left some of the worst patent infringers vulnerable to
liability by removing the 2-part test insulation provided by
Seagate.
Subarna Bhattacharya
J.D. Candidate 2018, DePaul University College of Law.
2017]1 269
15
Bhattacharya: Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016)
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2019
16
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol27/iss2/6
